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NOTES
The Municipal Zoning Power and Section 1983
Liability After Owen v. City of Independence
INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court has instructed that municipal
corporations are to be considered "persons" in actions pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983.' In Owen v. City of Independence,' the Court
extended the reach of this mandate by declining to find a qualified
immunity for municipal corporations implied within the terms of
the statute. The decision suggests that municipalities will now be
held strictly accountable for any constitutional violations.
In the area of land use regulation, however, local governments
have not traditionally been subjected to a rigorous standard of re-
view when the constitutional propriety of a municipal zoning re-
striction is challenged.' The Supreme Court has consistently de-
ferred to municipal discretion whenever it has addressed alleged
1. In Monell v. Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), the Supreme Court re-
evaluated the history surrounding § 1983, and overruled its earlier determination in Monroe
v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) that Congress intended to exclude municipal corporations from
liability under § 1983.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdic-
tion thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this
section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia
shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
2. 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
3. A zoning ordinance is constitutional if its objectives bear a substantial relationship to
the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare and if the classification is justifiable in
any way. Village of Euclid v. Ambler, 272 U.S. 365 (1926). The concept of general welfare is
not to be narrowly construed in this context, and has been held to include such things as
traditional family values and historic and aesthetic concerns in city planning. See Penn
Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Village of Belle Terre v. Borass,
416 U.S. 1 (1974); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
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unconstitutional actions involving zoning provisions. In light of
this well established trend, it is questionable whether Owen v. City
of Independence will diminish the discretion municipalities cur-
rently enjoy in the exercise of their zoning powers. Yet, the Su-
preme Court's most recent review of municipal duty in Owen indi-
cates that even land use regulation does not warrant such a relaxed
standard of review, particularly where such regulation is chal-
lenged on the basis of section 1983.
This article will outline the developments leading to the Su-
preme Court's present position in regard to municipal liability
under section 1983. It will present the standard of review applica-
ble to zoning questions and will examine what impact, if any,
Owen will have on the decided judicial preference for upholding
zoning ordinances. The article will consider how the decision might
alter the remedies available when it is demonstrated that a zoning
ordinance exceeds the limits permitted by the Constitution. Fi-
nally, the article will suggest an interpretation of Owen that at-
tunes the seemingly contradictory positions the Supreme Court has
assumed in the area of municipal liability.
SECTION 1983
History and Purpose
In the aftermath of the Civil War, Congress enacted Section
19835 in order to protect the rights, privileges, and immunities se-
cured by the Constitution as applied to the states through the
fourteenth amendment.6 Section 1983 provides a federal remedy
for violations of constitutionally protected rights, incurred under
color of law, whether the violation occurs by legislative, executive,
or judicial action. Despite the broad purposes of this provision,
4. See notes 26-47 infra and accompanying text.
5. Section 1983 and its jurisdictional counterpart, 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3), were first enacted
as part of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 in order to enforce the provisions of the fourteenth
amendment. The text of the present § 1983 emerged as a separate section when Congress
codified the existing law in 1874, and was implemented to protect rights secured by federal
laws as well as rights, privileges, and immunities guaranteed by the Constitution. See
Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). See also,
Developments in the Law: Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1133 (1977).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 provides, in pertinent part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
7. The statute places the federal courts as an interface between the individual states and
[Vol. 12
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however, the narrow reading of the fourteenth amendment after
the Civil War limited the effect section 1983 had in safeguarding
fundamental rights.8 Nevertheless, the interests protected by sec-
tion 1983 did not remain circumscribed. The gradual incorporation
of the Bill of Rights into the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment and the emergence of the modern equal protection
and due process doctrines served to broaden the bases from which
section 1983 plaintiffs could seek remedies for violations of their
constitutional rights.9
The early, narrow interpretation of the fourteenth amendment
was not the only impediment to actions under section 1983. The
language "under color of law" was similarly held to a limited defi-
nition.10 The most recent interpretations of section 1983, however,
the people, and it was designed to achieve both remedial and deterrent effects. Section 1983
was intended to ensure that injured plaintiffs would be afforded compensatory relief for
violations of their federally protected rights. Moreover, Congress anticipated that the availa-
bility of this remedy would protect against future violations as well. See Carey v. Piphus,
435 U.S. 247 (1978); Robertson v. Wegman, 436 U.S. 584 (1978).
8. It was early held in the Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872), that the
fundamental rights secured by the first eight amendments to the Constitution only provide
protection against federal transgression. The fourteenth amendment did not operate to pre-
vent similar state action. In these specific cases, it did not foreclose the state's ability to
construct a 25 year monopoly for slaughterhouses that precluded the successful operation of
the plaintiffs' businesses.
During this early period, the Supreme Court was hesitant to impose federal standards of
conduct onto the states, notwithstanding the broad provisions of the post-Civil War amend-
ment and § 1983. In fact, the Court emphasized the importance of state autonomy and
placed great weight on the states individual efforts in defining civil rights. See Gressman,
The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MICH. L. REv. 1323, 1330-1343 (1952);
Note, Section 1983 and Federalism: The Burger Court's New Direction, 28 U. FLA. L. REv.
904 (1976).
9. For a discussion of the incorporation of the Bill of Rights into the fourteenth amend-
ment, see Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, The
Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REv. 5 (1948); Henkin, Selective Incorporation in the
Fourteenth Amendment, 73 YALE L.J. 74 (1963).
10. The term "under color of law" was initially interpreted to mean that the plaintiff
must demonstrate that the violation of his constitutional rights occurred pursuant to the
enforcement of a statute or an ordinance. See Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939) (damages
awarded blacks who were denied the right to vote by a discriminatory state statute); Hague
v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (injunction against enforcement of city ordinance which pro-
hibited public meetings and distribution of printed materials); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S.
536 (1927) (damages awarded against election judge who in compliance with a state statute
refused to permit blacks to vote in a Democratic primary).
This language was later reinterpreted to encompass unauthorized conduct of a state of-
ficer who acted under the mere pretense of authority. In United States v. Classic, 313 U.S.
299 (1941), the Court held that the words "under color" of state law as used in 18 U.S.C.
§ 242, the criminal counterpart of § 1983, included actions by public officials which were
beyond the scope of their authority. This decision was reaffirmed in Screws v. United States,
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have broadened the remedies available under the provision. In Mo-
nell v. Department of Social Services," for example, the Supreme
Court overruled an earlier decision," and held that a municipal
corporation is a "person" within the parameters of section 1983
and can be liable for damages whenever official customs, policies,
or ordinances result in constitutional violations.13 This more ex-
pansive reading of section 1983 was continued by the Supreme
Court in Owen v. City of Independence.14
Immunities
In cases prior to Owen, the Supreme Court addressed questions
of immunity under section 1983 against a common law back-
ground, and found that the functions of state legislators, 5 judges,' 6
325 U.S. 91 (1945) (sheriff and deputy held liable under § 242 when they beat a handcuffed
prisoner to death.)
Following these cases, it was no longer necessary to show, in a criminal context at least,
that the conduct giving rise to the constitutional deprivation found its authority in a statute
or ordinance. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) established the same interpretation in
the civil context. The Monroe court held that plaintiff stated a cause of action against police
officers who allegedly entered plaintiff's home without warning and forced the occupants to
stand naked while the entire house was ransacked, even though the officers acted in a man-
ner inconsistent with state law.
11. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
12. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
13. The Court in Monell stated: "Local governing bodies can be sued directly under
§ 1983 for monetary, declaratory or injunctive relief where . . . the action that is alleged to
be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation or de-
cision officially adopted and promulgated by that body's officers." 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).
14. 445 U.S. 622 (1980). See notes 57-66 infra and accompanying text.
15. The Supreme Court examined the question of absolute immunity for state legislators
in Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951). The Court maintained that such an immunity
had existed at common law when § 1983 was first enacted, and emphasized that the demo-
cratic process was dependent upon the ability of legislators to exercise independent judg-
ment without the threat of liability under § 1983. Therefore, where the defendant is a state
legislator acting within the legislative field, absolute immunity attaches to his conduct.
Similarly, in Lake Country Estates v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391
(1979), the Court held that to the extent that members of a regional planning board were
acting legislatively, they were immune from liability.
16. In extending immunity to judges, the Court noted that "imposing [a burden of dam-
ages liability] on the judges would not contribute to principled and fearless decision-making,
but to intimidation." Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967). Judges at all levels were
protected by immunity at common law, and the question of whether the immunity applies
turns on whether the individual and the institution are exercising judicial functions.
As a result, judicial immunity has been extended to justices of the peace, Pennebaker v.
Chamber, 437 F.2d 66 (3rd Cir. 1971); municipal referees, Lucarell v. McNair, 453 F.2d 836
(6th Cir. 1972); and even members of quasi-judicial agencies, Silver v. Dickson, 403 F.2d 642
(9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 990 (1969). It is generally accepted that judicial im-
munity is limited to damages and does not extend to injunctive relief. See O'Shea v. Lit-
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and prosecutors1 7 warranted the protection that absolute immunity
affords. Furthermore, an individual defendant who was not abso-
lutely immune from liability for damages could still assert a quali-
fied immunity based upon his reasonable belief in the legality of
the challenged conduct and on his good faith in exercising his au-
thority."8 The development of immunity under section 1983 thus
focused on the public need for independent and responsible deci-
sion making in every branch and at all levels of government.19
tleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974); Timmerman v. Brown, 528 F.2d 811 (4th Cir. 1975); Erdmann v.
Stevens, 458 F.2d 1205 (2nd Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 889 (1972).
17. In Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976), it was made clear that prosecutorial
immunity from liability attaches where the prosecutor is serving in his role as an advocate.
The Court reached this conclusion by considering the effect of potential litigation on the
independence of the prosecutor's decision making process as well as on the availability of
checking a prosecutor's wrongdoings by alternative methods. Id. at 424-26, 429. The Court
was aware that the function of the prosecution and the defense within the criminal justice
system is to accurately determine guilt or innocence. In the Court's estimation, that goal
was best attained by granting wide discretion in the prosecutor's conduct trial. Id. at 426-27.
18. The application of a qualified immunity thus involves two determinations: whether
the defendant's conduct was based upon objective reasonable grounds and subjective good
faith. The first issue requires an inquiry into what the defendant knew or should have
known about the legality of his conduct. The second test calls upon the factfinder to evalu-
ate the state of mind of the defendant. In order to prevail, the defendant has the burden of
proving each component by a preponderance of evidence. See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S.
308 (1975).
Qualified immunities have also been exterlded to prison officials, Procunier v. Navarette,
434 U.S. 555 (1978); mental hospital officials, O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975);
school board members, Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975); state government execu-
tives, Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974); and police officers, Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S.
547 (1967).
19. The growth of municipal tort immunity has followed a similar functional analysis.
The ancient maxim that the King can do no wrong served as a basis for barring all suits
against the government. The harshness of the doctrine has been mitigated by distinguishing
between governmental functions, where immunity attaches, and proprietary functions,
where it does not. The courts recognize the dual function of municipalities and have refused
to immunize municipal corporations from transgressions in the exercise of their proprietary
functions. See Hodgins v. Bay City, 156 Mich. 687, 121 N.W. 274 (1909) (city liable for
injuries arising from municipality's sale of the electricity it generated to homeowners); Dal-
las v. City of St. Louis, 338 S.W.2d 39 (MW. 1960) (operation of municipal garage is a propri-
etary function); Griffin v. Salt Lake City, 111 Utah 94, 176 P.2d 156 (1947) (public swim-
ming pool is proprietary function).
The line between the differing functions is not easily drawn, however, and many states
have abolished municipal tort immunity based on this distinction. See, e.g., Muskopf v.
Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457 (1961); Molitor v. Kaneland Community
Unit Dist. No. 302, 18 Ill. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959).
While the governmental-proprietary distinction has thus met its demise, courts have re-
placed this doctrine by reserving immunity for municipalities' discretionary acts, and by
finding liability for torts rising from ministerial acts. Discretionary activity involves policy
formulation that requires an individual to respond in a manner of his own choosing. Minis-
terial acts, to which no immunity attaches, are those acts which do not require the exercise
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Nonetheless, the Supreme Court maintained in Owen that its deci-
sion to deny a municipality even a qualified immunity paralleled
both the developments in the common law and the Court's own
decisions under section 1983.0
LAND USE: REGULATION OF PRIVATE PROPERTY THROUGH
ZONING PROVISIONS
The right to own land finds clear expression in the "life, liberty
and property" language of the fifth and fourteenth amendments.2 '
It is equally obvious, however, that the right is- not absolute and
that it is subject to restriction when the public welfare so de-
mands.2" In the early part of this century, municipalities23 began to
exercise land use control by enacting ordinances that prohibited
nuisance-like conduct in certain areas of a city.2 4 The United
of independent judgment. The discretionary-ministerial division is not more easily applied
than was the governmental-proprietary distinction, and it arguably achieves only the same
result, but under a different guise. See E. McQuillan, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, § 53.22 a-g
(3d ed. 1977); Comment, The Discretionary Function Exception to Government Tort Lia-
bility, 61 MARQ. L. REv. 163 (1977).
For further discussion of municipal tort liability, see F. James, Tort Liability of Govern-
ment Units and Their Officers, 22 U. CHI. L. REv. 610 (1955); Leonard, Municipal Tort
Liability: A Legislative Solution Balancing the Needs of Cities and Plaintiffs, 16 URBAN L.
ANN. 305 (1979); Van Alstyne, Government Tort Liability: A Decade of Change, 1966 U.
ILL. L. F. (1966).
20. 445 U.S. 622, 635-50 (1980).
21. U.S. CONST. amend. V provides, in pertinent part: "No person shall... be deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken
for public use, without just compensation." 0
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV provides, in relevant part: "No State shall... deprive any per-
son of life, liberty or property, without due process of law."
22. Euclid v. Ambler, 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (restricted commercial use of property in resi-
dential zone); Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (1i Pet.) 420 (1837) (statute
which permitted the erection of neighboring toll free bridge did not deprive owners of
Charles River Bridge from property right in franchise to collect tolls from patrons of their
bridge). See Wright, Constitutional Rights and Land Use Planning: The New and Old Re-
ality, 1977 DUKE L.J. 841 (1977).
23. Individual landowners have long asserted private control over neighboring property
by utilizing techniques such as restrictive covenants and the doctrines of waste and nui-
sance. See Hoffman v. Cohen, 262 S.C. 71, 202 S.E.2d 363 (1974) (restrictive covenants pre-
vented construction of high rise condominiums in residential area); Spur Industries Inc. v.
Del E. Webb Development Co., 108 Ariz. 178, 494 P.2d 700 (1972) (operation of feedlot near
residential development was nuisance); City of White Plains v. Griffin, 255 App. Div. 1003, 8
N.Y.S.2d 462 (1938) (removal of topsoil constituted waste). See also Burby, REAL PROPERTY
at 141 (1954); Note, An Evaluation of the Applicability of Zoning Principles to the Law of
Private Land Restriction, 21 U.C.L.A. L. Rav. 1655 (1974).
24. See Hadacheck v. Sebastian, Chief of Police of City of Los Angeles, 239 U.S. 394
(1915) (ordinance prohibited the operation of a brick yard within the city's limits); Reinman
v. City of Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915) (ordinance barred the conduction of a livery
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States Supreme Court upheld these ordinances as valid exercises of
the police power. The Court then took the further step of approv-
ing a comprehensive zoning scheme in Village of Euclid v.
Ambler.28
Standard of Review
Euclid presented the Court with its first opportunity to pass
upon the validity of a comprehensive zoning scheme,26 and the
standard of review formulated then has not since been altered. The
Court held that a zoning ordinance is a valid exercise of municipal
police power and will be declared unconstitutional only when its
provisions are "arbitrary and unreasonable and [have] no substan-
tial relation to the public health, safety, morals or general wel-
fare. '27 The Supreme Court did not again review a comprehensive
zoning scheme until Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,2 s nearly fifty
years later, and it re-affirmed the standard of review established in
Euclid. Thus, although the Court requires a more rigorous review
over alleged constitutional violations in other areas of municipal
stable business in a certain part of the city).
These private and judicial methods of control were not always satisfactory for community
planning, and some municipalities turned to their powers of eminent domain to exercise
control over land development. The municipalities would impose restrictions on the private
landowner and then compensate him for the limited use of the property. See Kansas City v.
Kindle, 446 S.W.2d 807 (Mo. 1969). This technique, however, proved economically prohibi-
tive, and local governments were forced to find another method for regulating land use. See
1 Anderson, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING W1 1.02-2.05 (1968).
25. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). Euclid concerned the use of the police power to enact a compre-
hensive zoning scheme. There was great opposition to such schemes, although height and
area regulations brought little or no criticism from the courts. Following Euclid, courts in all
the states pronounced use-zoning regulations lawful if reasonable. See generally 1 Anderson,
AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING, 1 3.01-3.14 (1968); E. Bassett, ZONING: LAWS, ADMINISTRATION
AND COURT DECISIONS (1936).
26. In Euclid, restrictions were placed on the plaintiff's property by a zoning ordinance
that prohibited certain uses in particular districts. The ordinance in question disallowed the
establishment of commercial and apartment buildings in an area zoned for single family
dwellings. As a result, the value of the property declined from $10,000 per acre to not more
than $2,500 per acre. The landowner attempted to enjoin enforcement of the ordinance on
the ground that it violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The Su-
preme Court held that the zoning ordinance was a valid exercise of police power. 272 U.S.
365, 384-96 (1926).
27. Id. at 395.
28. 416 U.S. 1 (1974). The challenged ordinance in Belle Terre prohibited more than two
unrelated persons from sharing a house. The plaintiffs, college students, could not legally
share the dwelling they were renting. The Court found that the ordinance was a reasonable
exercise of legislative discretion, and that it did not unnecessarily impinge on the plaintiffs'
rights to privacy, association, or travel. Id. at 9.
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regulation,"' land use restrictions have continued to be evaluated
by this minimal standard of review."0
Fundamental Rights and Municipal Zoning Power
Zoning ordinances have been challenged on various constitu-
tional grounds. When fundamental rights are juxtaposed with the
municipal zoning power, however, the Supreme Court has given
great deference to the local authority.31 In Young v. American
Mini Theatres,3 2 the Court was confronted with the dilemma of
resolving the competing interests between the first amendment
and the municipal zoning power. An ordinance restricted the loca-
tion of certain uses, such as pool halls and adult movie theatres,
within one thousand feet of one another. The petitioners, owners
of adult movie theatres, brought a claim pursuant to section 1983,
alleging that the zoning controls impermissibly infringed upon
their first amendment right to freedom of speech.33 The Court ap-
plied the standard announced in Euclid, and rejected the first
amendment claims." The city's interest in preserving the character
29. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965) (broad statute cannot regulate what views
can be heard in city's effort to maintain peace and order); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S.
569 (1941) (regulation of parade on public street restricted only to time, place and manner
requirements); Cantwell v. Conn., 310 U.S. 295 (1940) (street discussion of religious views
not sufficient to demonstrate breach of peace).
30. See notes 31-47 infra and accompanying text.
31. See Penn. Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (landmark
designation for historic building not an unconstitutional taking); Village of Arlington Hts. v.
Metro Housing Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (challenge to alleged exclusionary zoning scheme
must demonstrate discriminatory intent to show violation of fourteenth amendment); Young
v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (regulation of place where film can be shown,
based on its c6ntents, not contrary to the first amendment); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,
416 U.S. 1 (1974) (zoning provision designed to preserve traditional family patterns in
neighborhood not contrary to fourteenth amendment).
32. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
33. The owners contested the validity of the ordinance on the ground that the licensing
procedures amounted to a prior restraint on the freedom of speech since the regulation was
only applicable if the content of the film met the standard described as "adult" by the
municipal code. Id. at 62. The restraint, the owners contended, was not a reasonable time,
place or manner regulation since it attempted to control the content of the film.
34. The difficulty with the result in American Mini Theatres is that the Court departed
from traditional first amendment standards of review. When it is necessary to resolve a
conflict between government regulation and first amendment values, the Court should ad-
dress "the character of the right, not of the limitation ... [to] determine[s] what standard
governs. . . ." Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945); see Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S.
39, 48 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Although the ordinance licensing procedures prohibited the plaintiffs from presenting
certain films, the Court refused to find that the effect was a prior restraint on protected
speech. Regulation of the place where the adult films could be viewed was not repugnant to
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of its neighborhoods outweighed the heavy presumption of uncon-
stitutionality that always accompanies any prior restraint of
speech and which extends to all manner of protected expres-
sion-even to expression that can be considered lewd or otherwise
unacceptable. 85
In comparison, when the municipality in Erznoznik v. City of
Jacksonville6 prohibited the showing of films containing nudity at
drive-in theatres whose screens were viewable from a public place,
the ordinance failed to meet the constitutional test..7 While the
city was restricting the same kind of speech under consideration in
American Mini Theatres, the regulation was not part of a zoning
scheme. Thus, only where the challenged ordinance was an exercise
over the city's land use control did the regulation withstand the
constitutional challenge.
A city has also relied on its zoning authority to limit the number
of unrelated people permitted to live in a dwelling unit. In Village
of Belle Terre v. Boraas,38 the Supreme Court found that an ordi-
nance prohibiting three unrelated persons from living together was
a valid exercise of the city's zoning authority. In upholding the or-
dinance, which was challenged on the basis of section 1983,' 9 the
Court evaluated the regulation by applying only a minimum stan-
dard of review. According to the test established in Euclid, it was
only necessary that the ordinance bear a rational relationship to a
permissible state objective. 0 Significantly, the Court majority
the first amendment since the films could be presented at certain locations in the city. Con-
sequently, the market for this commodity remained unrestrained. Young v. American Mini
Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 62 (1976).
35. For an interesting example, see Southeastern Promotion, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S.
546 (1975), where the refusal to permit a showing of the musical "Hair" in a city auditorium
because the showing was not in the best interest of the public amounted to an impermissible
prior restraint.
36. 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
37. The Court found the municipal regulation invalid on its face because it discrimi-
nated among movies solely on the basis of content. The prohibition against films containing
any nudity could not be justified on the ground that a municipality may protect its citizens
from being unwillingly exposed to materials that may be offensive. Nor could the ordinance
be rationalized as an exercise of the city's police power to protect children, or to guard
against distractions that would interfere with the flow of traffic and cause accidents. Id. at
212-215.
38. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
39. The plaintiffs, pursuant to § 1983, sought injunctive and declaratory relief on the
grounds that the restriction denied them equal protection of the laws and violated their
rights of privacy, association and travel. Id. at 3, 7.
40. Id. at 7-8. In its conclusion, the Supreme Court stated that a community could
utilize its zoning power to achieve a "quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and
1981]
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placed heavy reliance on its previous decisions which granted great
discretion to local governments in the zoning area.4'
Despite the Supreme Court's usual willingness to uphold zoning
controls in the face of constitutional challenge, it might initially
appear that the later case of Moore v. City of East Cleveland"
weakens the general premise that land use regulations can be sus-
tained on the rational basis standard of Euclid and Belle Terre. In
Moore, the Supreme Court held a zoning ordinance to a stricter
standard of review when the city's specific definition of "family"
prohibited the plaintiff from living with her son and two grandsons
who were first cousins. The regulation was found to be an imper-
missible interference into the family structure and was held uncon-
stitutional.43 Subsequent cases make clear, however, that Moore
does not stand for the proposition that the rational basis test for
zoning as established in Euclid and Belle Terre has been tempered
by Moore's more stringent standard.
For example, in Penn. Central Transp. Co. v. City of New
York, 44 the Court relied on the rational basis test when it upheld a
historic landmark designation scheme that required owners of
landmark buildings to submit any plans for renovation or altera-
tion for approval by the city planning commission. Historic and
aesthetic concerns were permissible legislative objectives and the
motor vehicles restricted . . ." to accommodate family needs. Id. at 9. The municipality was
not required to present evidence that its ordinance did, in fact, achieve those goals.
41. Id. at 9-10.
For further discussion of Belle Terre, see Note, Borass v. Village of Belle Terre: The
New, New Equal Protection, 72 MIcH. L. REv. 508 (1974).
42. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
43. In earlier decisions, the Court recognized that the institution of the family is deserv-
ing of stringent constitutional protection, and that when legislation interferes with the fam-
ily the Court shall not be willing to defer to legislative choice. In Moore, Justice Powell cited
past decisions that recognized the protection of rights surrounding childbearing, Cleveland
Bd. of Ed. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); and child raising, Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972);
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
These cases provide support for the Court's position that the legislature must demonstrate a
compelling government interest before regulations can interfere with the family. Thus, it
was this concern, rather than the land use regulation, which generated the Court's strict
scrutiny of the ordinance.
In Moore, the city could not demonstrate that the need to eliminate overcrowding and
traffic congestion justified the intrusion. Id. at 499-500. By implication, the language of the
ordinance in Village of Belle Terre v. Borass, 416 U.S. 1 (1974), did not cut so deeply into
the family structure and was allowed to stand. See notes 38-41 supra and accompanying
text.
44. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
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city was not required to show that the regulation in fact achieved
those goals. 5 Moreover, during the same term in which Moore was
decided, the Court held in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro.
Housing Corp.46 that a refusal to change a zoning classification to
accommodate plans to build racially integrated low and moderate
income housing is contrary to the fourteenth amendment only if
the plaintiffs could show a racially discriminatory intent. The pre-
sumption of constitutionality attended the municipality's zoning
ordinance, and the plaintiffs carried the burden of proving that a
racially discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor in the zon-
ing decision.' 7
It is apparent from these cases that the Court is not willing to
intervene in land use regulation disputes, even if the plaintiff can
demonstrate strong indicia of questionable conduct on the part of
a municipality. In other areas, however, as exemplifed by Owen v.
City of Independence," the Court appears to demand strict mu-
nicipal accountability and seems less willing to permit local gov-
ernments to exercise their authority at the expense of fundamental
rights.
OWEN V. CITY OF INDEPENDENCE
Background
In Owen, the petitioner, George D. Owen, Chief of Police in In-
dependence, Missouri, was dismissed after reports of an investiga-
tion of the City Police Department had been released to the news
media and turned over to the prosecutor for presentation to the
grand jury. Owen was not given any reasons to substantiate his dis-
missal. He was only given written notice that the discharge was
45. Pennsylvania Central Railroad, as owner of Grand Central Station in New York,
leased air rights over the station to a development firm to build a 53-story office tower. Two
design schemes were submitted to the planning commission, and both were rejected. Id. at
116-120.
The Court maintained that the restrictions did not impose an effective taking of private
property for public use without compensation. Implicit in its reasoning was that the ordi-
nance was related to a legitimate state objective, that the public had great interest in the
historic and aesthetic characteristics of the building, and that the burden on the private
landowner was small. Id. at 130-32.
46. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
47. The Supreme Court established in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) that
discriminatory effect and intent are generally required in all equal protection cases, and
must be present before a violation of the fourteenth amendment is demonstrated by the
plaintiff.
48. 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
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authorized by the city charter. Subsequently, the grand jury re-
turned a "no true bill"' 9 and no further action was taken by the
city.50
The petitioner brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against
the city, the City Manager, and members of the City Council, al-
leging that he was denied his substantive and procedural due pro-
cess rights by the discharge.5' The district court entered judgment
for the respondents on the ground that the dismissal did not de-
prive Owen, an untenured employee, of any protected property in-
terest."2 The lower court further found that the circumstances of
the discharge did not stigmatize his professional reputation,5 3 and
therefore he was not denied any liberty interest.
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit determined that the near simulta-
neous discharge of Owen and release of the investigation reports to
the news media damaged the petitioner's name and reputation and
deprived him of liberty without due process of law.5" The court of
appeals, however, held that all the respondents, including the city,
were entitled to a qualified immunity. The right to a name-clearing
hearing had only been crystallized after the petitioner's dis-
charge," and the Eighth Circuit extended the immunity to the city
because the court did not want to charge municipalities with pre-
dicting the "future course of constitutional law."5
Supreme Court's Decision
Owen v. City of Independence thus presented the Supreme
Court with the opportunity to decide whether a municipal corpora-
tion can assert a qualified immunity as a defense to section 1983
actions. The Court unequivocally held that the good faith of the
49. A return of a "no true bill" indicates that the grand jury did not find sufficient evi-
dence to indict the petitioner. See 1 L. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE UNDER THE FEDERAL
RULES, §§ 7:26-27 (1966).
50. 445 U.S. 622, 625-30 (1980).
51. 445 U.S. 622, 630 (1980).
52. 421 F. Supp. 1110 (W.D. Mo. 1976).
53. The district court determined that the petitioner was completely exonerated by the
investigative reports and the grand jury's return of the "no true bill." Moreover, the peti-
tioner was discharged prior to the Supreme Court decisions which found a property right in
a position for tenured employees, and which held that an individual is entitled to a name
clearing hearing when the governmental authorities make accusations against him. Perry v.
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). The district
court maintained that the City could not be liable for failing to meet these standards.
54. 560 F.2d 925, 938 (8th Cir. 1977).
55. See Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); note 53 supra.
56. 560 F.2d 925, 938 (8th Cir. 1977).
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municipality's officers cannot protect the local government from
damages liability flowing from constitutional violations under the
statute. 57 The Court further held that municipal corporations can-
not assert any qualified immunity to escape such liability.58
The Court arrived at this conclusion by conducting a historical
analysis of the doctrine of qualified immunity. The purpose of sec-
tion 1983 is to provide a broad remedy for persons wronged by the
misuse of power.59 This power is possessed by virtue of state law
and can be exercised to inflict injury only because the wrongdoer
acts under the authority of state law. The Supreme Court has
found that Congress intended to incorporate an immunity into sec-
tion 1983 if, at the time the statute was enacted, the immunity was
well established at common law.60 Thus, the decision in Owen is
predicated on the premise that there was no immunity for munici-
pal corporations at the time section 1983 was first passed by Con-
gress, and neither history nor policy can support a construction of
the statute that would extend a qualified immunity to a municipal
corporation. 1
In the Court's estimation, the rationales underlying governmen-
tal immunity from tort liability and immunity based upon good
faith62 are not applicable under section 1983. The presence of im-
munity under these theories is based upon sovereign immunity
which totally insulates the municipality from unconsented suits.
The Court maintained that "good faith" is not relevant once the
government becomes amenable to suit by enacting a statute such
as section 1983.6 Similarly, the doctrine of immunity for discre-
tionary or governmental actions cannot serve to promote municipal
immunity under section 1983 because a municipality has no "dis-
cretion to violate the Federal Constitution. '"04 In Owen, the major-
ity determined that since "elemental notions of fairness dictate
that one who causes a loss should bear the loss ' '65 municipal corpo-
57. 445 U.S. 622, 638 (1980).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 650.
60. By its terms, § 1983 "creates a species of tort liability that on its face admits of no
immunity." Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417 (1976) (emphasis added). Consequently,
if any immunities are to exist under § 1983, they must have been available at common law
when the statute was enacted by Congress. See notes 15-17 supra and accompanying text.
61. 445 U.S. 622, 650 (1980).
62. See note 19 supra.
63. 445 U.S. 622, 647 (1980).
64. Id. at 649.
65. Id. at 654.
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rations should compensate individuals who are wrongfully de-
prived of their constitutional rights. The Court indicated that the
government must serve as the harbinger of liberty and justice and
that it would be "uniquely amiss . . . if the government itself were
permitted to disavow liability for the injury it has begotten."66
OWEN'S IMPACT ON THE MUNICIPAL ZONING AUTHORITY:
AN ANALYSIS
Judicial Deference to Land Use Regulation:
A Substitute Immunity
When the Supreme Court's decision in Owen is superimposed
over the line of cases dealing with municipal land use regulation,
an inconsistency in the Court's philosophy becomes apparent. The
import of Owen is to ensure that municipalities are held accounta-
ble for their violations of federally protected rights. In the critical
area of land use regulation, however, municipalities have tradition-
ally been able to exercise wide control without being required to
demonstrate that a particular restriction is necessary to achieve a
valid purpose.6 7
A combined reading of Monell v. Department of Social Ser-
vices"8 and Owen indicates that a municipality's official policy or
ordinance must be the cause in fact of the injury before a plaintiff
can recover damages from a municipal corporation under section
1983. This burden, however, should not significantly inhibit a
plaintiff-landowner's action." Still, the fact that municipalities are
now subject to liability under section 1983, and cannot claim the
protection of any immunity, will not have great meaning for most
plaintiffs who claim injury from zoning restrictions. 70 Despite the
66. Id. at 651, quoting Adickes v. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970) (opinion of Brennan,
J.).
67. See notes 44-47 supra and accompanying text.
68. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
69. When a landowner attempts to challenge a zoning restriction on a constitutional ba-
sis under § 1983, it will not be difficult to show that the municipality's policy is the cause of
the constitutional injury. The property owner is deprived of the full and beneficial use of his
property due to the zoning restriction; "but for" the municipal corporation's official zoning
policy, no injury would have occurred.
70. While establishing cause in fact from the municipal ordinance to the injury might
not present a problem, the more difficult burden for the plaintiff-landowner will be to
demonstrate that there in fact has been a constitutional deprivation. This is due to the wide
discretion given to local governments in zoning decisions. See notes 26-47 supra and accom-
panying text.
More importantly, the present situation places the municipality in an even more favored
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Court's intention to make municipalities bear the burden of the
cost of operation, they still enjoy considerable latitude in the exer-
cise of their zoning authority. Indeed, even a qualified immunity
could not provide them a better shield from liability.
In Young v. American Mini Theatres'7 a city's interest in plan-
ning land usage was subject only to the "arbitrary and unreasona-
ble" standard announced in Euclid, and the Supreme Court re-
jected the petitioners' first amendment claims. Although American
Mini Theatres preceded both Monell and Owen, and a municipal-
ity was immune from liability under section 1983 at the time, the
considerable presumption of validity given to the city's zoning or-
dinance weakens the strength of a first amendment or other consti-
tutional claim that a future litigant might have under a similar or-
dinance.7 2 American Mini Theatres does not, of course, expressly
stand for the proposition that public policy requires municipalities
to have immunity in the exercise of their zoning authority, but it
implicitly supports that result. At the very least, it tends to place
the municipality in a preferred position when the exercise of its
zoning power clashes with a property owner's first amendment
rights. In contrast, a similar attempt to regulate speech in
Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville7 3 did not merit the same defer-
ence extended in American Mini Theatres when the ordinance was
not based upon the municipality's zoning authority.74
The case of Village of Belle Terre v. Borass 75 also illustrates the
Court's deferential review of zoning cases .7 The text of the opinion
and the majority's lengthy explanation of prior zoning cases give
rise to the inference that a municipality, in the exercise of its zon-
ing authority, bears a lesser burden of demonstrating the need for
its classifications than it would in other areas of regulation.77 Thus,
this discretionary posture toward a land use policy implemented
position. The defense of a qualified immunity would shift the burden of proof onto the
defendant. See note 18 supra. Now, of course, the burden is on the plaintiff who must
demonstrate that the regulation is not reasonable, but arbitrary. Village of Euclid v. Ambler,
272 U.S. 365 (1926).
71. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
72. See notes 32-35 supra and accompanying text.
73. 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
74. See notes 36-37 supra and accompanying text.
75. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
76. See notes 38-41 supra and accompanying text.
77. See Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1077-87
(1969); Note, Borass v. Village of Belle Terre: The New, New Equal Protection, 72 MICH. L.
REV. 508 (1974).
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by a municipal corporation eclipses whatever force Owen might
give to a section 1983 plaintiff who is injured by a zoning
restriction.78
Although the direction of Owen is to hold municipalities strictly
accountable for their actions, the law surrounding judicial review
of zoning cases dilutes this mandate. While it may be argued that
Monell and Owen are indications that courts must review all mu-
nicipal activities in a more probing fashion for purposes of section
1983-including alleged violations of the municipal zoning author-
ity-it is not likely that these two cases will reverse the flow estab-
lished by Euclid and its progeny. As long as the judiciary contin-
ues to defer to municipal discretion in the area of land use
regulation, municipalities will not bear the full consequences of
their actions as Owen requires.
For purposes of challenging zoning provisions, then, the broad-
ened, unqualified section 1983 remedy will have little real benefit.
Although the logical result of Monell and Owen is that the judici-
ary should homogenize the duty of care municipalities generally
owe under section 1983, municipalities will continue to enjoy the
benefit of exercising nearly untempered discretion in the area of
land use regulation. Municipalities are not held to the same strict
standard of review when they are alleged to impinge fundamental
rights in the exercise of their zoning authority as they are when
they allegedly violate constitutional rights through the exercise of
other powers. Therefore, the judicial tendency to defer to munici-
pal zoning authority will continue to be a steadfast bar to recov-
ery.79 Consequently, the remedies now available under section 1983
78. For example, in Penn. Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978),
a municipal planning ordinance denied the bankrupt owner of Grand Central Station the
possibility of leasing the air rights over the station to relieve some of the owner's financial
liability. The ordinance was upheld as a constitutional exercise of the zoning authority. See
notes 44-45 supra and accompanying text. See also Agins v. City of Tiburon, - U.S. -,
100 S. Ct. 2138 (1980).
Likewise, developers are faced with a very difficult task in attempting to demonstrate that
exclusions of certain uses are impermissible, or that municipal moratoria on development
are unconstitutional exercises of the police power. See Village of Arlington Hts. v. Metro.
Housing Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Construction Industry Ass'n of Sonoma Cty. v. City of
Petaluma, 552 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976); Golden v. Plan-
ning Bd. of Town of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291 (1972). See also Arlington
Heights: Planning for a Segregated Community, 14 URBAN L. ANN. 307 (1977); Payne, Dele-
gation Doctrine in the Reform of Local Government Law: The Case of Exclusionary Zon-
ing, 29 RUT. L. REV. 803 (1976); L. Davidoff and P. Davidoff, Opening the Suburbs: Toward
Inclusionary Land Use Controls, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 509 (1971).
79. The judiciary is often reluctant to involve itself in zoning decisions because there is
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are virtually unattainable when zoning irregularities are involved.
Municipalities, contrary to the tenor of the Owen decision, will re-
main unaccountable.
The Possibility of Greater Liability
Once, however, a plaintiff has successfully demonstrated a con-
stitutional violation caused by a zoning ordinance based on the
traditional standard of review, a city could be held accountable for
greater liability than the Court in Owen intimated. For example, a
developer may need to delay a construction project in order to
have a zoning scheme amended to qualify for a building permit. If
the proposed amendment were denied and the developer ulti-
mately prevailed on the theory that the ordinance was an unconsti-
tutional exercise of the zoning authority, then the city could be
liable for damages of increased construction costs and for lost prof-
its during the period of delay.80
Usually, damages are not available in zoning cases because zon-
ing has been considered a legislative function, and municipalities
have been immune from liability in the exercise of their discretion-
ary responsibilities.$' The Owen decision, however, removes that
some doubt whether it has the power to invade the legislative sphere and compel a munici-
pality to structure its zoning to accommodate the plaintiff-usually a developer who is con-
cerned only with a specific site. The courts are faced with the dilemma of balancing the site-
specific interests of the developer with the community's general interest in planned growth.
In Illinois, however, a trial court may order a municipality to permit the requested use
once an ordinance is found invalid. Sinclair Pipe Line Co. v. Richton Park, 19 Ill. 2d 370,
167 N.E.2d 406 (1960). Other jurisdictions have hesitated to intervene in that manner. See
C.O.M.E. v. Chancey, 289 Ala. 555, 269 So.2d 88 (1972); Shelburne, Inc. v. Buck, 240 A.2d
757 (Del. 1968); City of Louisville v. McDonald, 470 S.W.2d 173 (Ky. 1971); Boggs v. Bd. of
Supervisors, 211 Va. 488, 178 S.E.2d 508 (1971). See also, Hartmann, Beyond Invalidation:
The Judicial Power to Zone, 9 URBAN L. ANN. 159 (1975); Hyson, The Problem of Relief in
Developer-Initiated Exclusionary Zoning Litigation, 12 URBAN L. ANN. 21 (1976).
80. Moreover, the municipality would be liable not only if the ordinance were unconsti-
tutional on its face, but also if it were unconstitutional as applied to the specific site. See
Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928) (zoning ordinance may be reasonable as it ap-
pears on its face, but unreasonable as it applies to a particular site).
A landowner is not strictly bound by the zoning choice for his property and can seek to
change the existing regulations as they apply to his parcel. Seemingly, the duty imposed by
§ 1983 requires not only that the municipality's zoning ordinance fall within constitutional
parameters generally, but that the city must also anticipate what proposed uses a developer
may want to place on a specific parcel of land.
81. See note 19 supra. Although the fifth and fourteenth amendments require munici-
palities to compensate landowners when private property is taken for public use, the sover-
eign immunity doctrine traditionally prevents damages in zoning cases. See United States v.
Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946); Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). For an interest-
ing discussion of this topic, see Badler, Municipal Zoning Liability in Damages-A New
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limitation. While the burden of demonstrating a constitutional vio-
lation of rights remains high, the exposure to potential liability
from unreasonable land use restrictions is now greatly increased.
Owen should thus deter decision makers from using the municpal
zoning power to achieve improper purposes.5 2
The nature of building and developing is necessarily costly and,
in order to avoid burdensome liability, municipalities will likely
carefully consider whether a zoning ordinance is within constitu-
tional parameters before enacting or amending the provision.
Thus, while Owen does not alter the judicial standard of review
applicable to zoning issues and does not serve as a ready compen-
satory vehicle for alleged violations of the zoning authority, it may
still have a valuable impact as a deterrent to future questionable
zoning restrictions. Although the laxed standard of review remains
constant, the possible scope of municipal liability is significantly
broadened.
CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court's expressed intention in Owen
v. City of Independence is to hold municipal corporations account-
able for their violations of federally protected rights. Owen and the
earlier decision of Monell v. Department of Social Services work
Cause of Action, 5 URBAN LAW. 25 (1973).
82. The decision in Owen is potentially most useful in the area of exclusionary zoning.
Under § 1983, a zoning ordinance can be declared unconstitutional if it can be established
that there is a racially discriminatory effect, and if there is some evidence of discriminatory
intent. These kinds of cases are most often based on facts that are typical of the urban-
suburban conflict.
When suburban communities choose to limit the type and the number of available hous-
ing units within their boundaries, the cost of the housing remains high and effectively keeps
the poor and minorities out. A developer purchases property within the community, and
then petitions for a zoning change from single family dwellings to multiple family dwelling
which would house the poor and minorities. Of course, this is arguably the result against
which zoning might have been structured to guard.
If the court requires the municipality to provide the specific zoning request the developer
is seeking, then it denies the community its prerogative to determine at what site multiple
family dwellings might best serve the public interest. If the court does not grant the specific
relief the developer is asking, but permits the zoning change on another site, then later
developers will not attempt to challenge exclusionary zoning schemes because the risk of
receiving any compensation would be too great.
Now that a municipal corporation may be held liable for its constitutional torts under
§ 1983, a court can award damages to the plaintiff-developer and allow the city to amend its
total zoning scheme without requiring it to provide site-specific relief to the developer. After
Owen, a court can give damages to the injured plaintiff, yet not intrude in the legislative
sphere. A remedy will be provided, and the threatening presence of liability will help deter
municipalities from planning their communities to wholly exclude certain types of uses.
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together to provide an unqualified remedy when plaintiffs are de-
nied their constitutionally protected rights due to the implementa-
tion or execution of a municipality's official policy. The magnitude
of these decisions, however, fades when it meets the well estab-
lished precedents regarding the exercise of the municipal zoning
authority. In the area of land use regulation, the broadened rem-
edy will have little real benefit. When a fundamental right is alleg-
edly violated through the exercise of the municipal zoning power,
it will receive less protection than it would if the municipality at-
tempted to curtail the right through another channel of authority.
This is due to the fact that the standard of review differs. Thus,
while a municipality may now be liable to a landowner for eco-
nomic losses caused by a zoning ordinance, the plaintiff who relies
upon section 1983 must still shoulder a particularly heavy burden
to demonstrate that the implementation of land use controls de-
nied him a federally protected right.
The decision in Owen, however, indicates a clear intention to
hold municipalities liable for their actions and to spread the cost of
their transgressions on all of those who benefit from municipal
government. It is not difficult to urge that the new standard of ac-
countability generally under section 1983, necessarily requires a
stricter standard of review when zoning ordinances meet funda-
mental rights. This position, of course, is dependent upon a broad
interpretation of the Owen decision. In the absence of more spe-
cific articulation by the Supreme Court, the line of cases dealing
with municipal authority in the area of land use regulation defeats
the Owen mandate of strict municipal accountability.
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